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This essay examines the role of communal division in changes to Fiji’s constitution 
during the decade prior to Fiji becoming an independent state. Amicable relations 
between indigenous Fijians and Indians who migrated under indentured servitude began 
to crack in 1959 and broke open during political negotiations and the constitutional 
conference of the 1965. The subsequent election in 1966 solidified the political gains of 
fledgling parties and entrenched communal divides between the pro-Indian National 
Federation Party and the Alliance Party, theoretically race neutral, representing the 
interests of Fijians. By 1969 the political calculus of both the National Federation Party 
and the Alliance Party shifted in favor of a bid for independence. However, to convince 
London that Fiji was ready for self-governance, a demonstration of communal harmony 









Fijian High Chief Lala Sukuna often spoke of colonial Fiji as a three-legged stool 
where indigenous Fijians contributed land, ethnic Indians contributed labor, and 
Europeans contributed capital.1 Each leg of the stool remained isolated from the others 
while contributing to the stability of the Fijian economy. However, the metaphoric stool 
was never as stable as Sukuna characterized. In April 1959 an Australian expert, O. H. K. 
Spate observed in a report to the British Governor of Fiji that “interracial relations are 
remarkably good; but the equilibrium is unstable.”2 His words were prescient. The 
equilibrium, upon which communal relations were based, rested on a continued 
communal isolation that became more untenable. As the 1960’s wore on, inter-communal 
conflict, especially between the Indian and Fijian communal groups, became an enduring 
legacy of Fijian politics as Fiji transitioned from colonial rule to independence.  
 Fiji in the 1960’s offers an excellent opportunity to examine how constitutional 
changes in legislative representation could encourage continued communal division 
despite overt calls for national unity. The elections that resulted from change in 
                                                
1 Lal, Brij V. In the Eye of the Storm: Jai Ram Reddy and the Politics of Postcolonial 
Fiji. (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010), 41. Throughout this essay ethnic Indians are 
referred to as Indians. When references are made to citizens of India the difference is 
clarified in the text. 
2 O. H. K Spate. The Fijian People: Economic Problems and Prospects: A Report. (Suva: 
Government Press, 1959), 5. When Spate referred to “interracial relations,” he was using 
the word race as it was used in government documents rather than as a comment on 




representation stimulated the growth of communally based political parties and charged 
political negotiations. Political negotiations, especially in the lead up to the 1965 
constitutional conference, were couched in terms of communal division by the 
participants. Likewise, negotiations that led to Fijian independence were viewed through 
a lens of communal division. This study focuses on Fiji from 1959 through 1970. It was 
in 1959 that two major reports were completed analyzing the political situation in Fiji. 
These reports posit that continued communal isolation was problematic and was holding 
the colony back economically. Independence for Fiji in 1970 is a natural conclusion to 
the period of study.  
This essay analyzes inter-communal struggle in Fiji by examining efforts to 
consolidate political power through constitutional changes in electoral methods and 
representation in the Legislative Council in the 1960’s. By analyzing electoral procedures 
and communal representation, I will argue that the British government of Fiji maintained 
and encouraged manufactured communal identities. I will also argue that for pragmatic 
reasons, these communal identities became self-reinforcing through the elections of 1963 
and 1966 as political parties emerged under the auspices of representing separate 
communities. The development of communal political parties, supported by electoral 
results, buoyed party leadership in their efforts to consolidate further political power, 
both within their respective communities and in the Fijian government. The struggle over 
electoral methods and legislative representation in Fiji illustrates the impact that 





In 1643 Abel Tasmen, a Dutch navigator, became the first European to discover 
the islands that became known as Fiji, located north of New Zealand and East of 
Australia. However, Fiji would not be charted until 1840 when Charles Wilkes, a United 
States Navy officer, created the first set of maps that showed the 332 islands.3 European 
missionaries, specifically Wesleyans, arrived in Fiji and began the work of Christianizing 
the Fijians in the 1830’s.4 By 1871 the European population, bolstered by Australian and 
New Zealand settlers, reached 3,000. Economics, specifically the cotton and coconut 
trade, overtook religious fervor in attracting European settlers.5 On October 10, 1874 Tui 
Viti (King of Fiji) Cakobau and eleven other Fijian chiefs signed the Deed of Cession 
granting sovereignty to the British Crown.6 Britain had resisted the offer of cession on 
multiple occasions, beginning in 1858, but finally agreed to accept sovereignty over Fiji 
when the need to protect British settlers overtook financial concerns of taking on another 
colony.7 Europeans engaging in commercial activity collaborated with the Fijian chiefs 
prior to cessions, however once Britain took control of Fiji the balance of power shifted 
away from the chiefs to the Europeans.  
                                                
3 Paris, Sheldon. "Abel Tasmen is Credited with the Discovery of Fiji." Stamps 252, no. 5 
(Jul 29, 1995): 11. http://search.proquest.com/docview/220949960?accountid=13360. 
Also, "Fiji." Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed November 20, 2015. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fj.html. 
4 Brantlinger, Patrick. "Missionaries and Cannibals in Nineteenth‐century Fiji." History 
and Anthropology, vol. 17, no. 1 (2006): 21-38, 27. 
5 Michael C. Howard, Fiji Race and Politics in an Island State. (Vancouver, B.C.: UBC 
Press, 1991) 21. 
6 Stephanie Lawson, "The Myth of Cultural Homogeneity and Its Implications for Chiefly 
Power and Politics in Fiji." Comp. Stud. Soc. Hist. Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 32, no. 4 (1990): 795-821, 799. Also W. David McIntyre. Winding up the British 
Empire in the Pacific Islands. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 126. 
7 David Routledge, "The Negotiations Leading to the Cession of Fiji, 1874." The Journal 




Throughout the colonial period Fijian chiefs relied upon the Deed of Cession to 
ensure continued “paramountcy” of Fijian interests.8 The first British Governor of Fiji, 
Sir Arthur Gordon (1875-1880), instituted a form of indirect rule in which Fijians could 
“progress at their own pace in their own traditional surroundings.”9 Gordon created two 
separate administrations to govern Fiji, one for Europeans and another for Fijians.10 
Gordon’s action unified the disparate Fijian tribes under a single bureaucracy, creating a 
communal group where previously there had not been one. His land policies codified 
Fijian communal ownership of more than eighty-three percent of Fiji.11 Communal land 
ownership, along with tax policies that permitted taxes to be in kind instead of cash, 
made it possible for subsistence farming in the Fijian community to continue into the 
mid-twentieth century.12 Gordon intended his policies to last just long enough for Fijians 
to develop in a way that would bring them into line with Europeans. However, the 
colonial government he created in Fiji continued his policies and openly encouraged 
                                                
8 In the Eye of the Storm, 67. To the Fijian Great Council of Chiefs, paramountcy meant 
that Fiji was to be for the Fijians and Fijian interests superseded all other interests. This 
was especially so where Indian interests were at odds with Fijian, but it also applied to 
European interests in theory. 
9 “Gordon, Arthur Charles Hamilton, first Baron Stanmore (1829–1912),” Mark Francis 
in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, eee ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian 
Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2011, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33459 (accessed October 1, 2015). Also, Brij V 
Lal, Islands of Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji. (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 
2006) 2-3. 
10 Fiji Race and Politics in an Island State, 24-25.  





isolation of Fijians, even advising tourists during the 1930’s, to avoid socializing with 
Fijians.13 
 When Gordon arrived in Fiji, the islands were suffering economically. The cotton 
market in Europe suffered a precipitous collapse in 1870 at the beginning of the Franco-
Prussian war with the price of cotton in London falling by three fourths as cotton flooded 
the markets.14 To help spur the Fijian economy Gordon reoriented commercial agriculture 
towards the cultivation of sugar. He granted a monopoly to an Australian firm, the 
Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSRC). Along with the monopoly Gordon approved 
plans to institute indentured servitude to provide laborers on the sugar plantations 
because he was “reluctant for the Fijians to be used for Western profiteering.”15 
Beginning with the arrival of the ship Leonidas on March 4, 1879 and ending thirty-seven 
years later, the CSRC transported 60,965 Indians to Fiji, the majority of whom came 
from northern provinces although by the end of indenture recruitment shifted to the 
southern provinces.16 Under the term of indentured servitude, Indians who served five 
years were eligible to return to India at their own cost, or for an additional five years the 
CSRC would cover the cost of the return trip. Despite the offer of return to India, the 
majority of Indians who went to Fiji opted to remain in Fiji. To many of the Indians who 
made the journey, Fiji represented a break from the rigid caste system of India, a place 
                                                
13 Robert Norton. "Averting ‘Irresponsible Nationalism’: Political Origins of Ratu 
Sukuna's Fijian Administration." The Journal of Pacific History 48, no. 4 (2013): 409-
428, 412-413.  
14 Fiji Race and Politics in an Island State, 22. 
15 Farzana Gounder, Indentured Identities: Resistance and Accommodation in Plantation-
Era Fiji (Philadelphia, PA, USA: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2011.) 21. For 
further reading on the indentured servitude system within Fiji see Brij V. Lal, Chalo 
Jahaji on a Journey through Indenture in Fiji. (Acton, A.C.T.: ANU E Press, 2012) 




where people could make it based on their own merit and work ethic.17 The rapid rise in 
the Indian population of Fiji threatened the hegemony of the indigenous Fijians.  
  In 1945 Governor Philip Mitchell (1942-1944) worked with Sukuna to transform 
the Native Administration into a new system called the Fijian Administration.18 This new 
administration was an effort by British administrators to mollify Fijian chiefs.19 Mitchell 
feared that Fijians and Indians might begin collaborating together against the European 
authority in Fiji. Fijian chiefs used the newly minted Fijian Administration to reinforce 
their position of power within the Fijian community.20 This represented a retrenchment 
into further isolation for the Fijian community at a time when the pace of decolonization 
was increasing around the world. Despite official support for the Fijian Administration, 
the British Governor of Fiji, Ronald Garvey (1952-1958), spoke about the importance of 
national unity replacing communal divisions.21 Regardless of calls for national unity, the 
colony maintained communal elections and a multiracial constitution. The decision to 
                                                
17 The Fijian People, 5. 
18 Philip Mitchell served as the Governor of Tanganyika prior to his posting in Fiji. 
Following his post in Fiji, Mitchell served as the Governor of Kenya. “Mitchell, Sir 
Philip Euen (1890–1964),” D. W. Throup in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
eee ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. 
Lawrence Goldman, January 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/35045 
(accessed November 22, 2015). 
19 Robert Norton, "‘A Pre-eminent Right to Political Rule’:1 Indigenous Fijian Power and 
Multi-ethnic Nation Building." Round Table 101, no. 6 (December 2012): 521-535, 523. 
20 Robert Norton, "Accommodating Indigenous Privilege: Britain's Dilemma in 
Decolonising Fiji." The Journal of Pacific History, 37, no. 2 (2002): 133-56, 135. 
21 "Accommodating Indigenous Privilege, 135. Also, “Colonial administrators and post-
independence leaders in Fiji (1875–2000),” Alex May in Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, eee online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, Oxford: OUP, October 2005; online 
ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, May 2015, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/theme/93236 




maintain a multiracial constitution and communal elections is reminiscent of decisions by 
the British Colonial Office across the empire as colonies approached independence.  
Many scholars have examined multiracial representation in British colonial 
legislative bodies. This is especially true for African colonies approaching independence. 
Although Ronald Aminzade’s Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Post-Colonial Africa is a 
general history of race and nationalism in Tanzania, he addresses racial based voting in 
Tanganyika before independence.22 Robert Maxon’s Britain and Kenya’s Constitutions, 
1950–1960 is an excellent work that demonstrates the unpredictable nature of 
constitutional changes.23 Kenya’s independence in 1963 brought with it a change to non-
racially based voting that Kenyan political leaders lobbied London for throughout the 
1950’s. The unifying theme in Kenya and Tanganyika, both of which gained 
independence shortly before Fiji, was a call for changes to their respective constitutions 
to permit non-communally based voting. While these works address communally based 
voting schemes, this essay contributes by analyzing changes in the context of a colony 
consisting of a minority indigenous population with special privileges and a non-
indigenous majority population with limited rights. Focusing on Fiji provides opportunity 
to analyze communally based voting in terms of minority rights instead of strictly settler 
rights. Additionally, when Kenya and Tanganyika obtained independence, communally 
based voting was cast aside whereas in Fiji, communally based voting was retained.   
                                                
22 Ronald Aminzade. Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Postcolonial Africa: The Case of 
Tanzania. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
23 Robert M.Maxon, Britain and Kenya's Constitutions, 1950-1960. (Amherst, N.Y.: 




Traditionally, historians of Fiji have viewed societal ills in terms of “the nature of 
Fiji’s plural society.”24 However, some scholars have undertaken an effort to more 
accurately describe group identities.25 Stacey-Ann Wilson argues for examining Fijian 
communal groups in terms of ethnicity rather than race. She points out that both race and 
ethnicity are potentially problematic in the case of Fiji since each of the communal 
groups are composed of multiple sub “ethnocultures.” Indians in Fiji were not monolithic, 
especially in terms of religion (Hindu, Christian, Muslim, and Sikh). Similarly, Fijians as 
a communal group were “regionally differentiated.”26 Despite numerous sub-cultural 
differentiations within each communal group, the Fijian constitution identified 
representation based on broad categorization. Because of the way in which the 
communally based Fijian electoral system was designed, self-identity and differentiation 
within each communal group, while important to each individual, was relegated in favor 
of political unity within a given communal group for purposes of electoral politics. 
Certainly, each communal election entailed candidates differentiating themselves from 
their opponents, but the nature of communal representation reduced the potential impact 
of internal disputes. 
                                                
24 Stephanie Lawson. "Constitutional Change in Fiji: The Apparatus of Justification." 
Ethnic and Racial Studies. vol. 15, no. 1 (1992): 61-84, 61. 
25 Scholars have accomplished much of the scholarly work in racial and ethnic identity. 
Some examples include: Michael Omi, and Howard Winant. Racial Formation in the 
United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s. (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986) 
also David John Howard. Coloring the Nation: Race and Ethnicity in the Dominican 
Republic. (Oxford, U.K.: Signal Books, 2001) and also Omi, Michael, and Howard 
Winant. 2008. “Once More, with Feeling: Reflections on Racial Formation”. PMLA 123 
 (5). Modern Language Association: 1565–72. 
26 Stacey Wilson. Politics of Identity in Small Plural Societies Guyana, the Fiji Islands, 




In recent years, many historians that study Fiji have focused their attention on the 
military coups of the 1980s. It was only seventeen years after independence that the first 
coup took place in Fiji. Typically, analysis of the military coups begin with a brief 
discussion of the Deed of Cession and then skip over to consideration of the lasting 
impact of the 1970 constitution.27 This essay does not analyze post-colonial communal 
relations, but it does contribute to that analysis by beginning eleven years prior than what 
is typical. By beginning analysis of the relationship between Legislative representation 
and communal division in 1959, this essay shifts traditional analysis and sets that study 
on a more firm foundation.  
The first section of this essay analyzes the two major reports commissioned by the 
British Governor of Fiji and published as Legislative Council papers along with a 
classified report Professor Spate submitted to the Colonial Office. These three reports 
provided a foundation for the political change that occurs throughout the 1960’s 
including the first election after Fijians obtain the franchise in 1963. The second section 
illustrates how communally based negotiations leading up to and at the constitutional 
conference of 1965 and the results of the subsequent elections of 1966 reinforced 
communal identity. In the last section I will demonstrate that communal division between 
Fijians and Indians could be concealed when the political aims of the political parties 
                                                
27 Brij Lal, A Time Bomb Lies Buried Fiji's Road to Independence, 1960-1970. (Canberra, 
A.C.T.: ANU E Press, 2008). Also, Deryck Scarr. Fiji: Politics of Illusion, the Military 
Coups in Fiji. (Kensington, NSW, Australia: New South Wales University Press, 1988). 
Also, Ghai, Yash, and Jill Cottrell. "A Tale of Three Constitutions: Ethnicity and Politics 
in Fiji." International Journal of Constitutional Law 5, no. 639 (2007). Also, Susanna 
Trnka. State of Suffering Political Violence and Community Survival in Fiji. (Ithaca: 





representing the two communities coincided. Ultimately, I will demonstrate that 
communal identities and divisions were reinforced through the process of changing the 





CHAPTER 1.  COMMUNAL ISOLATION AND THE EXPANSION OF 
COMMUNAL DIVISION 
Sir Kenneth Maddocks, the British Governor of Fiji, commissioned two studies 
on the situation of Fiji in 1959. O. H. K. Spate, Professor of Geography at the 
Australian National University, crafted a report on The Fijian People: Economic 
Problems and Prospects on April 9, 1959, published as Council Paper No. 13 of 1959 
by the Government Press in Suva.28 Less than a year later the Government Press 
published the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Natural Resources and 
Population Trends of the Colony of Fiji, 1959 in May of 1960.29 Sir Alan Burns, the 
former British Governor of Nigeria, led this effort, colloquially known as the Burns 
Commission.30 Combined, these reports demonstrated that the existing political 
balance along communal lines was increasingly tenuous. Spate’s commentary 
asserted that the social situation in the Fijian community was restraining economic 
development. The Burns Commission called into question the viability of maintaining 
a separate administration for Fijians. Both reports focused mostly on indigenous 
Fijians, however the increasing interactions between Fijians and Indians threatened 
                                                
28 The Fijian People. Spate authored a second report, The Fijian Political Scene: 
Some Reflections. This report, however, was submitted to the Colonial Office and 
held as confidential until 1989. R. G. Ward and O. H. K. Spate. "Thirty Years Ago: A 
View of the Fijian Political Scene Confidential Report to the British Colonial Office, 
September 1959." The Journal of Pacific History: 103-24. 103. 
29 Report of the Commission of Enquiry. 





the precarious balancing act that had kept Fiji relatively balanced throughout the early 
twentieth century.  
Concerns regarding demographics and land ownership illustrated clear 
differences in opportunity for the people of both the Fijian and Indian communities, 
but the clearest differences in opportunity were in governmental administration. The 
make-up of the Legislative Council, the only representational body in the colonial 
administration that accounted for all people in Fiji, offered opportunity along 
communally based lines. While the Legislative Council represented all people, the 
Fijian Administration existed strictly for Fijians, leaving out both Europeans and 
Indians. Support for the Fijian Administration was strong with Fijian Chiefs, as it 
bolstered their position within the Fijian community, but the practical result of the 
Fijian Administration was continued isolation of the Fijian community. Both Spate 
and the Burns Commission denounced The Fijian Administration for the impact it had 
in advancing communal division at a time when the British colonial government 
called for national unity. 
Spate relayed that in his opinion, although relations between Fijians, Indians, 
and Europeans were amicable in daily interactions, the political future of Fiji was 
“gloomy.”31 The gloom that Spate predicted related to the divisions between the 
communities that were largely predicated on isolation. Each community had its own 
challenges to overcome for unity to occur. He began by addressing what he termed 
the “Indian challenge.”32 In the first place, the Indian population exceeded the Fijian 
and European populaces. Spate called attention to the fact that the Fijians operated 
                                                
31 “Thirty Years Ago,” 104. 





under a “quasi-autonomous administration” while the numerically smaller European 
population possessed “political strength out of all proportion to its numbers by virtue 
of the political arithmetic of 'parity' in Legco.”33 When the 1959 Annual Report was 
compiled, Fijians comprised 41.9 percent of the population, while Indians comprised 
49.4 percent of the population. Europeans, including Part-Europeans, were just 4.7 
percent. This equated to legislative representation of one member per 33,800 Indians, 
29,600 Fijians, and 1,280 Europeans.34 Despite political inequity between the racial 
groups, a concerted effort was made to deny the existence of “racial disharmony.”35  
 Spate argued for public acknowledgement of communal division and 
associated problems.  
“One can hold back for a long time a numerical majority possessed of little 
education and economic strength; for a shorter time, and with more difficulty, 
a minority possessed of these; but a numerical majority (emphasis in the 
original) increasingly strong economically and with educated middle-class 
leaders cannot permanently be denied equivalent political strength except by 
sheer force — and even that may be, probably will be, too costly. The only 
thing to do is to try at least to find some way to exorcise and canalise its 
demands in advance; but nothing, surely, can be more disastrous than to refuse 
to admit (in public) the existence of a racial problem, while at the same time 
exacerbating it by constant pinpricks at the expense of the majority 
community. Yet such in effect seems to be the 'policy' of the more influential 
European and Fijian leaders, and that is why the situation, beneath the surface, 
is so frightening.”36  
 
Spate contended that the growing dissatisfaction in the Indian population would 
eventually force its way to the surface regardless of attempts to marginalize concerns. 
The unofficial policy, antagonizing the Indian population while denying the existence 
of inequity in communal divisions, of what Spate considered “influential European 
                                                
33 Ibid. LegCo is a shortened term for the Legislative Council.  
34 Fiji: Report for the Year 1958, 125. 






and Fijian leaders” was only exacerbating divisions. Regardless of the desires of the 
European and Fijian leadership the “racial problem” existed, and Spate argued that 
the best course of action was public admission by leaders in Fiji. The publication of 
his report to the Governor contributed to public acknowledgement of the divide, 
though his argument here was for a change in public policies related to the communal 
divide. 
Communal relations were generally split along Fijian and Indian lines with 
Europeans typically aligning with Fijians in terms of public policy. The effects of 
policies, such as land purchase restrictions and Fijian Administration, enacted by the 
colonial government had disparate impacts on different groups. Spate indicated that 
the European population was able to adapt to cultural issues in Fiji because they were 
fewer in number and, in general, had the resources needed to adjust.37 If the European 
population was capable of adapting to cultural transformation because of greater 
resources and fewer numbers, it stands to reason that the Fijian and Indian 
populations were viewed as less capable of adjusting to cultural adaptation. Although 
he viewed communal relations as “extraordinarily good,” Spate cautioned that the 
reason for those good relations was that the competing Indian and Fijian cultures 
were operating side by side with little intersection.38 Despite apparently good 
relations in 1959, communal groups remained isolated in Fiji, and projected increases 
in populations meant that those cultures would begin to intersect and conflict more 
often.  
                                                






The Indian population increased from 588 in 1881 to 60,634 in 1921 (an 
increase of 1,031%). While the Indian population expanded quickly through 
indentured servitude, the Fijian population declined. The Fijian population fell 
precipitously from 114,748 in 1881 to 84,475 in 1921 (a decrease of 26%).39 The 
Indian population continued rapid growth, exceeding the growth of the Fijian 
population. By the conclusion of 1959, Indians in Fiji totaled 191,328, approximately 
49 percent of the total population. By comparison, the Fijian population numbered 
162,483, approximately 42 percent of the total population. The remaining population 
was split among European, Part-European, Chinese, and Other Pacific Races.40 Fiji 
boasted both a higher birth rate and a low mortality rate, compared with developed 
countries. The birthrate per 1,000 for Indians was 47.4 in 1959 compared to the Fijian 
birthrate of 36.9.41 These birthrates were typical of the years surrounding 1959.42 If 
the status quo was retained the Indian population was expected to become a dominant 
majority in Fiji. Even though the Indian community possessed numerical dominance 
in the population, the Fijian community possessed dominance in the key area of land 
ownership.  
Land ownership and usage was aligned with communal division from the 
signing of the Deed of Cession. The principles, which guided land use and ownership, 
were derived Paragraph 4 from the Deed of Cession: 
“That the absolute proprietorship of all lands not shown to be alienated so as 
to have become bona fide the property of Europeans or other foreigners or not 
                                                
39 Ibid. 
40 Fiji: Report for the Year 1959, 9. 
41 Fiji: Report for the Year 1959, 126. Also, Fiji: Report for the Year 1960, 125. 
42 Fiji: Report for the Year 1960, 125. Fiji: Report for the Year 1961, 132. Also, Fiji: 





now in the actual use or occupation of some Chief or tribe or not actually 
required for the probable future support and maintenance of some chief or 
tribe shall be and is hereby declared to be vested in Her said Majesty her heirs 
and successors.”43 
 
This limited opportunity to own land for anyone who did not already own land in Fiji 
after 1874. By the beginning of 1960, land distribution heavily favored the Native 
Customary Tenure. Thus, Fijians, as a communal group, possessed 83.6% of the total 
landmass of Fiji. Crown Land consisted of 6.4% of the landmass. Freehold Land, 
individually titled landowners, consisted of 10%. Despite being a plurality of the 
population, individual Indian landowners possessed just 1.7%.44 The official policies 
of the colonial government restricting land ownership forced individuals into 
communal identities. All Fijians, regardless of which island or tribe they were from, 
owned the land together. Similarly, Indians were frozen out of the land market with 
very few exceptions. Despite significant internal differentiation within communal 
groups, land policy recognized only communal identity.  
Burns observed that the “Land Problem” rested mostly in the poor usage of 
agriculturally viable land in Fiji. Freehold land, privately held land sold by Fijians to 
Europeans before Cession in 1874, was not available to small farmers and some of it 
was not being used. The British government owned Crown land. Fijians communally 
owned all land other than freehold land and Crown land. In the estimation of the 
members of the Burns Commission, Fijians failed to adequately utilize the 
                                                
43 Joeli Baledrokadroka, “The Fijian Understanding of the Deed of Cession Treaty of 
1874”. Appendix A. Conference paper presented at Traditional Lands in the Pacific 
Region: Indigenous Common Property Resources in Convulsion or Cohesion, 
Brisbane, Australia (September 7-9 2003)  





communally owned land.45 Notwithstanding communal ownership of the vast 
majority of land across the island group, the Fijian lands were actually at a distinct 
disadvantage compared to Crown land, since much of the land was not agriculturally 
viable. Of 2,611,548 acres on Viti Levu, the largest island in Fiji, 1,645,500 acres 
were considered to be useless for agricultural purposes. Only 280,866 acres, 
approximately eleven percent, were considered arable, cultivatable land.46 Vanua 
Levu, the second largest Fijian island, was only slightly better with thirteen percent 
considered arable, cultivatable land.47 Thus, despite having the advantage of 
possessing the vast majority of land in Fiji, usable land only represented a small 
portion of these holdings. Owning land was different than possessing rights to work 
the land. The Indian population held the majority of leases on arable land.48 
Individual Indians possessed leases for 350,000 acres across Fiji, with 222,000 acres 
within the “cane belts,” in 1959.49 By obtaining leases, individuals overcame the 
communal disadvantage of being prohibited from owning land. The right to own land 
was a significant economic factor, but it was also a significant political issue that split 
along communal lines. Any attempt to alter government policies related to land tenure 
and ownership along communal lines would have to start at the Legislative Council. 
The Legislative Council consisted of sixteen official members, including the 
Colonial Secretary, Attorney-General, and Finance Secretary in an ex officio capacity. 
Additionally, there were fifteen “unofficial” members of the Legislative Council; five 
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Fijians, five Indians, and five Europeans. It was through the “unofficials,” members 
of the council without a portfolio, that the inhabitants of Fiji were directly represented 
in the colonial government. Selection to the council was dependent upon communal 
category. Three Indian and three European “unofficials” were elected every third year 
with the remaining representatives being nominated. Indians obtained franchise, over 
the objections to the Fijian Great Council of Chiefs, in 1929, although the first elected 
Indians boycotted from 1929-1932 in protest for not having equality with the 
European members.50 The Great Council of Chiefs submitted a slate of between seven 
and ten Fijian “unofficials” to the Governor. The Governor then selected five of the 
nominated Fijians.51 Differentiated methods for selecting representatives in the 
Legislative Council varied based on communal group and illustrated significant 
distinctions between the communities. Unofficials in the Legislative Council 
represented whole communal groups regardless of internal differentiation.  
The hierarchy and traditions of Fijian culture made it difficult for Fijians to 
freely interact with their representatives. One Fijian expressed, “These representatives 
are to deliver in the Legislative Council what the people cannot tell the chiefs who are 
the present members and who are government officials and according to our Fijian 
customs it is not easy to discuss things freely with them.”52 To address the disparity 
between the directed representation of Fijians and the direct representation of Indians 
and Europeans, the Burns Commission recommended that instead of the Great 
Council of Chiefs nominating all five seats, they should nominate two with the 
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remaining seats selected through direct elections.53 Removing the responsibility of the 
Great Council of Chiefs to nominate the full slate of Fijian representation in favor of 
direct representation was a threat to homogeneity of the Fijian communal group. 
More significantly, it was a threat to the power of the chiefs. It would mark a 
significant shift in the Fijian culture.  
Whereas the Legislative Council represented the three primary racial 
categories in Fiji, the Fijian Administration existed solely for the purpose of 
supporting Fijians. The Fijian Administration was supposed to act as “a local 
government system,” but the Burns Commission noted, “There is little local 
(emphasis in original) government as the provincial officers are largely controlled 
from headquarters where there is a ‘Central Fijian Treasury’. Where the population is 
mixed the administration is entirely racial, and not local, as it deals only with 
Fijians.”54 The commission concluded that “in a colony of this size a double 
administration is wasteful of man-power and money, and we believe that the well-
being of the Fijians could safely be left in the care of the District Officers.”55 While 
the commission concluded that the dual administration should be abolished, they were 
also careful to articulate that it should be abolished gradually, “pending the 
introduction of local government.”56 The Burns Commission believed that since the 
Fijian Administration had an isolating effect on the Fijian community, an effort to 
abolish it immediately might serve to further isolate the community through fear of 
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losing cultural identity. Replacing the Fijian Administration with local government 
would remove the communal aspect of the existing administration by including the 
Indian community within the responsibility of the local government.  
 The Fijian communal system represented a significant difficulty in moving the 
colony to adopt a new form of local government rather than the existing Fijian 
Administration. The communal system required Fijians to observe multiple traditional 
obligations that included the “planting and upkeep of food crops.”57 Despite the Fijian 
Administration’s control over communal life, Spate observed “the natural direction of 
growth is towards individualism; and from many talks with Fijians both in the koro 
and the towns, I feel assured that it is increasingly the direction desired by the people: 
most notably on Viti Levu, but, even if to a lesser extent, also in the islands.”58 The 
communal responsibilities levied on Fijians contributed to a decreased ability to 
contribute to individual economic success since an individual may be obligated to 
perform communal duties at economically pivotal times such as “planting or reaping 
his crop.”59 Communal responsibilities, enforced by the Fijian Administration, 
reinforced the isolation of the Fijian community.  
Early in his report, Spate illustrated the political difficulties implicit with the 
Fijian Administration. He posited that the existence of a separate administration 
dedicated to the advancement of Fijians by its very nature, tended to maintain “racial 
separatism.”60 Any efforts undertaken to reduce the policing and regulatory powers of 
the Administration would likely cause a significant amount of consternation amongst 
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the Fijian population. Specifically, Spate cautioned, a direct assault on the 
administration from the outside would likely be countered by a rush to defend it.61 
The Spate and Burns Commission reports exposed the fragility of the communal 
divide in Fiji. Spate’s prediction of backlash against calls to dissolve the Fijian 
Administration proved to be correct.  
Both the Burns Commission and Spate reports recommended reducing, and 
eventually eliminating, the Fijian Administration in 1959, however, F.J. West, a 
Senior Fellow in Pacific History at Australia National University, recommended 
against the dissolution of the Fijian Administration. Although West argued for 
maintaining the Fijian Administration, he conceded that, “Too often the purpose 
which Sukuna had in mind for the Fijian Administration shades off into another: 
preservation of the status quo.”62 Even a scholar committed to keeping the Fijian 
Administration understood that it meant retaining Fijian isolation. Despite the 
observations of Alan Burns, a Colonial Office veteran and former colonial 
administrator, that the Fijian Administration exacerbated communal division in Fiji, 
(Harold) Julian Amery, Parliamentary Undersecretary of State, rejected the negative 
implications of the administration in November of 1960 saying, “I see no future in the 
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Burns recommendation that the Fijian administration should be wound up as soon as 
possible.”63 Amery went beyond simply rejecting the eventual abolishment of the 
Fijian Administration. He stated, “I would personally be inclined to go further and 
encourage the development of some Indian counterpart to the Fijian 
administration.”64 His purpose in recommending a separate administration was to 
recognize the separate natures of the Indian and Fijian cultures since, as he saw it, the 
differences between Indians and Fijians were more dissimilar than those of Jews and 
Arabs.65 He accused the Burns Commission of aggravating tensions between 
communities with their recommendations.66 Amery thought that the dissolution of 
communal isolation was the key to aggravating tensions, and he was in a position to 
ensure policies that encouraged isolation were maintained. 
Ravuama Vunivalu, a Fijian Legislative Council member, slammed the Burns 
Commission report as an assault on the “Fijian way of life,” and that the position of 
Fijians “in the Colony was not as invulnerable as they had hoped it to be.”67 Vunivalu 
expressed concern that Fijian control over the colony might be fading as Indian 
political power seemed to be rising. The situation in Fiji was summed up in an 
editorial On March 15, 1960 in the Times of London, which stated, “To-day Indians 
control most of the sugar cane production and form exactly half of the population. 
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The Fijians themselves make up only two-fifths of the population. They are generally 
less advanced, both economically and politically (Indians have the vote, Fijians have 
their representatives in the Legislative Council chosen for them by the Chiefs), but 
they own the land which the Indians need.”68 The Indian population appeared to have 
overtaken the Fijian community demographically, economically, and politically. 
What remained uniquely Fijian were the land and the Fijian Administration. 
Regardless of Amery’s desires, Fiji was no longer capable of remaining communally 
isolated without relations between communities deteriorating.  
The reality of rising tensions between Fijians and Indians could not be ignored 
in perpetuity. On December 31, 1961, an article titled "Fiji Independence Demand," 
buried on page ten, concerned the future of Fiji. The increased emphasis on 
independence for colonies was not lost on Fiji’s political leadership. Fijian Paramount 
Chief Cakobau, a direct descendent of Tui Viti Cakobau, demanded that when 
independence came to Fiji, the British government ought to return the island group to 
the Fijian people. Indian leaders in Fiji objected to this demand. The brief article in 
the Times made only a passing reference at the end of the article illustrating the 
growing tension; “Both the Fijians and Indians have five members of the Legislative 
Council. There have been some sharp exchanges between them recently.”69 The 
members of the communally selected Legislative Council represented distinct 
communities. Regardless of political ideology, each representative argued on behalf 
of communal concern, and those concerns had become sharp.  
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The make-up of the Legislative Council was altered in 1963. Whereas prior to 
elections in early 1963 there were fifteen members split up by communal group, 
following the elections the size and purpose of the Legislative Council had shifted 
significantly. The Legislative Council expanded in size to thirty-seven members 
including nineteen ex-officio members, four elected Europeans, two nominated 
Europeans, four elected Fijians, two nominated Fijians by the Great Council of Chiefs, 
four elected Indians, and two nominated Indians.70 More important than changes in 
the structure of the Legislative Council was the election itself. While elections 
remained communal, the April elections denoted the first time that Fijians were given 
the opportunity to directly vote for their representatives.71 
Turn out significantly increased in the 1963 elections with 59,895 votes cast 
compared to just 13,356 votes in 1959.72 While this increase in voters may have 
represented a move towards more inclusive representation of Fijians who went to the 
polls for the first time, the communal nature of voting meant that the representative to 
represented ratio remained inherently unequal.73 The essential difference in 1963, at 
least for the Fijian population, was the method of selecting representatives in addition 
to the expanded number of representatives for each communal group in the 
Legislative Council. The Fijian franchise was a major shift in the internal Fijian 
relations with the government. Individual Fijians now had a say in governance 
outside of the hierarchy of the Great Council of Chiefs.  
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Because the election remained communally based, the candidates running for 
office were only concerned with attracting the votes of those within their communal 
group. As a result, the campaign in 1963 illustrated the continued isolation of 
everyday life for Fijians and Indians. According to Norman Meller and James 
Anthony, the Indian candidates tended to focus on “such issues as free medical 
treatment, housing, higher wages, or social security, pensions, and destitute 
allowances,” whereas these concerns were largely absent from the Fijian campaigns.74 
Meller and Anthony attributed this to “the distinction between Indian individualized 
life and Fijian communal living.”75 The campaigns showed Indian identity was based 
on individual merit and success, thus a concern for social welfare emanating from the 
state rather than from pre-existing communal structures. This was a marked 
difference from the Fijian community that was still steeped in communal 
responsibility that came from community rather than from the state. 
The campaigns shed light on ongoing inter-communal relations as well. Most 
of the campaign statements made by Fijian candidates contained explicit pro-Fijian 
sentiment without explicitly stating an anti-Indian bias. Both Fijian and Indian 
candidates expressed support for “one-nationism,” although the phrase had 
significantly different practical meaning depending on who was using the phrase. 76 
To Indians, as the majority population, “one-nationism” meant legal equality with 
Fijians and likely control over the political system in Fiji. For the Fijian candidates, 
“one-nationism” was combined with a pro-Fijian sentiment meant to exclude Indians 
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from the political and legal system of Fiji. Thus, the campaigns of 1963 demonstrated 
that nature of the electoral system was continuing to isolate the populations into 
communal groups. Campaign rhetoric demonstrated that communal division was an 
important political issue in Fiji even though voters remained isolated within 
communal voting groups.  
The political aftermath of the 1963 elections was most evident in Indian 
politics. Citizens Federation, a loose collection of local Indian political parties 
throughout Fiji, performed well in the 1963 elections capturing all three elected, 
communal Indian seats in the Legislative Council. The Federation Party developed 
from the Citizens Federation and adopted a formal constitution on June 21, 1964 and 
became Fiji’s first official colony-wide political party.77 Siddiq Koya, one of the three 
elected Indians, drafted the constitution. Upon adoption, A.D. Patel was elected as the 
first president of the party, and Koya was elected to be the first vice-president.78 The 
Federation succeeded in dominating Indian politics in Fiji although the population it 
claimed to represent was much more diverse than the party recognized. Despite 
internecine political struggle, the Federation parlayed election results to ensure that 
the party’s definition of Indian concerns was represented to the governments in Suva 
and London as the Indian perspective. Thus, the Federation subsumed Indian political 
identity.  
The Federation operated as the sole colony wide political party in Fiji until 
1966 when the Alliance Party was created. Similar to the founding of the Federation, 
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the Alliance emerged from a collection of existing local political parties and was 
officially formed on March 14, 1966 with Ratu Mara as the first party leader. The 
Alliance billed itself as a multiracial political party despite the generally recognized 
purpose of representing Fijian interests.79 The Fijian Administration and the Great 
Council of Chiefs encouraged Fijian isolation through cultural and structural methods. 
The Alliance emerged to confront the growing political threat of the Federation and in 
doing so it subsumed Fijian political identity.  
Professor Spate and the members of the Burns Commission submitted reports 
that clearly laid out the economic situation in Fiji at the end of the 1950’s, but more 
than just commenting on the economy, the reports illustrated the communal isolation 
of Fiji, especially in the Indian and Fijian communities. The most controversial aspect 
of the Burns report, recommendations regarding the eventual dissolution the Fijian 
Administration, was supported by Spate. The Undersecretary of State, Amery, who 
supported continued communal isolation in Fiji, rejected this recommendation. 
Despite continuing policies of communal isolation, the British colonial government 
gave the Fijian community the franchise in 1963. The elections of 1963 remained 
communal affairs as voters went to the polls to vote for representatives of their 
respective communal groups. The campaigns focused on internal political debates, 
but the results of the election had a significant impact on the communal identity as 
Fijian and Indian communal politics as political parties emerged from the chaos of the 
first Fijian election. Elections in 1963 were a turning point for Fiji’s isolated 
communal systems. Direct, communal representation brought Fijians into conflict 
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with Indians. Political negotiations between the communal groups were altered as 
Fijians had a voice in who represented them. This is especially evident in the 







CHAPTER 2. REINFORCING COMMUNAL DIVISION AND POLITICAL 
IDENTITY THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS 
Shortly after the elections of 1963 preparations began for a constitutional 
conference. According to the Annual Report for 1965, “The purpose of the conference 
was to work out a constitutional framework for Fiji which would preserve a 
continuing link with Britain and within which further progress could be make in the 
direction of internal self-government.”80 Internal self-government was Great Britain’s 
eventual goal for Fiji, though not one that came with a timeline.81 Before the 
conference opened on July 26, 1965, various issues had to be ironed out.82 Some of 
these issues included discussion about full independence for Fiji, who would be 
invited, and whether or not representation in the Legislative Council would remain 
communally based. 
 The topic of independence from Great Britain, fully supported by Federation 
representatives and fully rejected by the Fijian and European representatives, was 
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tabled in advance of the conference.83 The official report out of the conference 
stipulated a “general agreement had been reached in Fiji that independence was not 
an issue to be discussed.”84 Internal self-governance, distinct from independence, 
remained a primary purpose for the conference. Fijians viewed self-governance as 
Fijians controlling Fiji, employing the Deed of Cession to support this view. Apisai 
Tora, a Fijian politician argued that since it was Fijians, not Indians, who signed the 
Deed of Cession only Fijians should be invited to the Constitutional Conference in 
London.85 The Colonial Office rejected this argument in favor of including Indians.  
 The British Governor of Fiji, Sir Derek Jakeway initially recommended that 
each racial community nominate representatives for the 1965 conference.86 The Fijian 
delegation was not adverse to this recommendation. However, issues arose when the 
Indian delegation nominated only members of the Federation Party. Jakeway balked 
at the exclusion of Indians not aligned with the Federation based on the belief that the 
Federation did not adequately represent all Indians in Fiji.87 He proposed a change to 
the process of selecting representatives where the “unofficial” members of the 
Legislative Council would select delegates for the conference. Patel strenuously 
objected to the Legislative Council selecting delegates on the grounds that selection 
of communally aligned delegates by members of other groups was tantamount to 
interference in the internal affairs of each group.88 This argument was a bit 
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disingenuous given the Federation stance of supporting common rolls for electing 
legislative representatives. The Federation leadership had won the communal seats 
and was consolidating Indian support within the political party and sole 
representation on behalf of Indians would further coalesce Indian political identity 
within the party. Regardless of the motivations behind Patel’s objections, Whitehall 
intervened in the negotiations and forced Jakeway to relent. The Federation’s 
objections resulted in invitations being extended to all of the elected, “unofficials” of 
the Legislative Council. 89 
 Voting method was a key issue for those representatives who would attend the 
constitutional conference in London. There were two competing methods for 
selecting representatives in an election. Communal roll voting was the status quo. In a 
communal roll situation each voter is asked to choose their preferred candidate from a 
list that only includes members of the same racial, or communal, group. Thus, in Fiji 
a Fijian voted only for Fijians, and Indians were only permitted to vote for Indians. 
Communal roll voting also means a guaranteed allocation of elected officials 
according to racial community. In general, the Fijian leadership supported the 
continuation of the communal roll voting system. Indian leadership generally backed 
a common roll scheme for Fiji, although the community was split on whether to 
support a communal roll voting or common roll voting scheme.90 Common roll voting 
is a method where voters are able to select their preferred candidate from a list 
regardless of the race of the voter or candidate. Using a straight common roll does not 
guarantee an allocation of seats according to racial community. In a racially divided 
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Fiji, the Fijian political leaders, such as Apisai Tora and Ratu Mara, believed that a 
common roll voting system would lead to an Indian dominated Legislative Council.  
Maintaining communal roll voting was in the interest of both Fijians and 
Europeans because of the numerical disparity with the Indian community. By 1965 
the Indian population had gone from being a plurality of the total population in Fiji to 
being the majority with 50.08% of the population. By comparison, the Fijian 
community was just 41.49% of the population, and Europeans totaled just 2.29%.91 It 
is, therefore, not surprising that the Fijian and European communities would 
encourage the continued use of communal roll voting, thereby increasing their per 
citizen representation. In 1965, the communal representation system meant that there 
was one elected representative for 58,835 Indians, 48,750 Fijians, and 2,689 
Europeans.92 With birthrates projected to remain stable, the imbalance of 
representation appeared likely to grow. 
It is hardly surprising that the Federation leadership supported common roll 
voting for Legislative Council elections. Granting each adult in Fiji a vote that could 
be cast on behalf of any candidate would theoretically curtail the over-representation 
of Fijians and Europeans and would almost certainly favor the Indian community. In 
Spate’s 1959 report, he observed, “The more a common representation is postponed 
(and in this age it probably cannot be postponed for ever), the weaker is the Fijian 
share (emphasis in original), and the less they can learn of how to use the share they 
have.”93 The concept of common roll voting may have been the most equitable in 
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terms of representative to constituent ratios, and in some quarters it was viewed to be 
inevitable eventually, but it was an untenable solution in 1965.94 
Adoption of common roll voting in Fiji was an essential part of the Federation 
platform. A.D. Patel outlined his reasons for adopting common roll voting. He argued 
that common rolls were a way to create unity in Fiji, had been successful in the 
African colonies, and would pressure the people into acting along political lines 
rather than racial lines.  Patel decried communal rolls as inevitably dividing people, 
limiting the ability of representatives to compromise in the best interest of the nation, 
and exacerbating communal differences.95  
 Despite the passionate advocacy of Patel and the Federation, Fijian and 
European political leadership in Fiji rejected common roll voting in favor of 
continued communal roll voting. Even though the Fijian population lacked a unified 
political party to face off against the Federation, the existing parties that represented 
Fijian interests acted in a unified way. This would not have been likely under a 
common roll system. The political fracturing of the various parties would likely have 
assisted the Federation. If Indian proposals related to common roll were realized, 
Fijians feared that they would lose the ability to maintain their place in society since 
the numerically superior Indians would have the majority of the representation in the 
Legislative Council.96 The anti-common roll sentiment was summed up in a Fijian 
phrase, “E na vula se na balabala,”: “We will have common roll when the balabala 
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flowers.”97 A balabala, a tree fern, does not flower.98 Patel referred to this notion as 
exacerbating communal suspicions and anxiety.  
 In March 1965, Governor Jakeway provided the Federation reason for further 
suspicion and anxiety when he said, “I thought it was common ground that the Fijian 
people – the autochthonous people – have a special position in Fiji because they 
belonged here first, long before anyone else came here. It was inconceivable that 
Britain would ever permit the Fijian people to be placed politically under the heels of 
an immigrant community.”99 According to the Governor, the British position mirrored 
that of the Fijian politicians. The Governor’s comments seemed to confirm Federation 
leaders suspicions that negotiations were useless. On 25 April 1965, the Federation 
Party voted to withdraw from informal talks in Fiji. The Fiji Times was publishing 
supposedly confidential conversations from the negotiations. The Federation put out a 
statement accusing the Fiji Times, the Public Relations Office, and the Fiji 
Broadcasting Commission of being anti-Federation.100 
 As offensive to the Federation as the comments by Jakeway were, they were 
tame compared to comments in May 1965 by Apisai Tora, who publically called for a 
commission to look into the potential of ejecting the Indian population from Fiji. 
Using Burma and Ceylon as examples, he stated, “If Fiji’s and Fijian interests are to 
be protected then the quickest possible way should be found to send the Indians to 
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other countries.”101 Beyond the intransigence and offensive nature of this statement, 
Tora proclaimed his distrust in Indians while proclaiming affinity towards Europeans. 
He called for the exclusion of Indians in the constitutional conference. He commented, 
“We know the Europeans and we can get along with them. We also know what they 
will advocate for in the coming London conference. As for the Indians, we do not 
know what they want or what they are going to say in London. They are keeping 
quiet, and we don’t like it.”102 Despite deep misgivings, and the ongoing boycott of 
informal talks, discussion continued between the leadership of the Fijian political 
parties and the Federation. Negotiations leading to the constitutional conference 
illuminated communal divisions.  
The constitutional conference opened in London on July 26, 1965.103 
Although independence was excluded from consideration, the Fijian and Indian 
positions on independence could not be fully avoided. After all, one of the essential 
goals of the conference was to assist Fiji in moving towards internal self-governance. 
Although mentioned previously, the definition of self-governance depended on the 
person using it. Patel, representing the Federation, viewed the conference as a vehicle 
for creating momentum towards Fijian independence. The level of self-governance 
sought by Patel and the rest of the Indian contingent was clearly articulated by Patel: 
“The constitution should empower the local government to conclude trade agreements 
with other countries and provide for further delegations of authority to be made by the 
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British government.”104 The Indian delegation pushed for more authority on faster 
timelines than the Fijian delegation was prepared to accept. 
 The Fijian stance on moving towards self-governance was much more muted 
by comparison. Ratu Mara, representing Fijians, stated, “We have declared that 
independence is not our goal because we have never found any sound or valid reason 
to attenuate, let alone abandon, our historical and happy association with the United 
Kingdom.”105 For Europeans and Fijians in Fiji, the conference might at best be used 
for modest movements toward self-governance, but the radical changes advocated by 
Patel were not desired at the time of the conference. Fijian delegates viewed Indian 
pressure to move quickly into independence as a way for the Indian community to 
politically subjugate Fijians.  
 In a clear message that internal self-governance would be delayed, delegates 
agreed to a compromise where the Crown would continue to appoint the Governor of 
Fiji.106 In practical terms, the agreement rejected the Indian delegates proposals for 
immediate internal self-governance. The British Governor represented a continuation 
of external power over Fiji. However, while the Crown retained authority to appoint 
the Governor, there were other changes that demonstrated shifts in the power 
structures of Fiji’s government. The new constitution limited the power of the 
Governor in appointments. The Governor lost all authority to appoint unofficials to 
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the Legislative Council.107 While the make-up of the Legislative council was changed 
in favor of elected officials, the nature of the communal voting changed as well. 
The Legislative Council would be expanded to thirty-six members. Of those, 
nine would be communally elected Fijians with an additional two Fijians appointed 
by the Great Council of Chiefs. For the first time, Rotumans and Pacific Islanders 
other than Fijians would be included in the Fijian communal vote. The Indian 
communal delegation in the Legislative Council would consist of nine elected 
members. The European communal delegation would grow to seven members and 
would include the Chinese and other various communities not aligned with the Fijian 
community for purposes of franchise. Thus, the communally elected members of the 
Legislative Council would total twenty-seven. Beyond the communally elected 
members there would be an additional nine members elected through a compromise 
method of cross-voting in three constituencies.108 Thus, the racial make-up of the 
Legislative Council would be fourteen Fijians, twelve Indians, and ten Europeans.109 
The constitutional conference delegates in London introduced aspects of common roll 
voting in hopes of politically integrating the entire population of Fiji, but at the same 
time the communal voting rolls were freshly infused with new aspects of racial 
division.  
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 The final make-up of the Legislative Council was a compromise between the 
Indian call for full and immediate implementation of common roll voting and the 
combined Fijian/European call for continued communal roll voting. Common roll 
voting might have all but guaranteed an Indian majority in the Legislative Council, so 
it is no surprise that it was rejected in favor of continued communal roll. The system 
of cross-voting and communal voting was opposed by the Indian delegation, but what 
was most upsetting to the delegation was the increased representation of Fijians in the 
Legislative Council. The first argument utilized by the Fijian and European 
delegations was that “the additional representation was justified by the special 
position occupied by the Fijian community in Fiji.”110 The second argument for 
granting Fijians two more seats than Indians was the inclusion of Rotumans and 
Pacific Islanders in the Fijian communal representation.111 The Indian population 
viewed this second argument with suspicion. At the end of 1965, the Indians 
comprised 50.08% of the population while combined the Fijians, Rotumans, and 
Pacific Islanders comprised just 44.31%.112 The Fijian delegation, with the support of 
the European delegation managed to increase communal representation in the 
Legislative Council. With negotiations on representation completed, the conference 
attendees turned their attention to securing rights for their respective communities.  
 Delegates at the conference attempted to ensure that those they represented 
would be protected in a Bill of Rights. Like other proposals at the conference, support 
for aspects of the Bill of rights fell along communal lines. The Indian delegates 
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objected to exclusions to freedom from discrimination. Freedom from discrimination 
was accompanied with a policy whereby current laws that dictated discrimination 
would not be immediately nullified. Instead, freedom from discrimination meant that 
new discrimination could not be introduced into law, nor could it be reintroduced if 
the current legal discrimination were reduced or eliminated.113 The Indian delegation 
protested that current laws approving discrimination should be voided with the 
introduction of the constitution, or at the very least a sunset provision should be 
included that would grant a limited timeframe before the laws were nullified. This 
sunset provision would not prevent nullification of discriminatory practices if 
repealed by the government prior to the official sunset. These proposals for 
immediate end to discrimination were rejected by the Fijian delegation, but the intent 
to eliminate discriminatory laws was retained and agreed to by the Fijian, Indian, and 
European delegations.114  
 During the conference, the Indian contingent attempted to use the process to 
gain momentum towards independence while the European and Fijian contingents 
worked to stall that very same momentum. The result appeared to favor the Fijian and 
European communities since the Fijian community had picked up more seats in the 
Legislative Council, maintained two positions nominated by the Great Council of 
Chiefs, and reduced the potential of common roll voting to influence future elections. 
The process of communal negotiations confirmed communal divisions within Fiji’s 
political structure, but more than that, the conference expanded division by increasing 
Fijian representation, as a ratio of total representatives in the Legislative Council, and 
                                                






confirming existing discriminatory laws aimed at the Indian population. The new 
constitution became official on September 23, 1966 in advance of the elections, 
which would begin just three days later on September 26, 1966.115  
Amongst changes that confronted voters were an expanded Legislative 
Council, a new confusing cross-voting system, and the removal of literacy as a 
requirement for voting.116 The complexity of electing representatives was not lost on 
the editors of the Fiji Times. Letters to the editor elucidated the voter confusion with 
the new voting procedures. Lindsay Verrier, an European Alliance candidate in the 
Northern Eastern Cross Voting constituency, wrote to the Fiji Times, “But in the Suva 
General Constituency there will be three vacancies; so, if there are five candidates 
here, I will wish to support three of them, and reject the other two. I must therefore be 
given three General votes in the Suva Constituency where I reside. Similarly, voters 
in the West Viti Levu General Constituency will have to exercise two votes each.”117 
Verrier’s letter illustrated the general confusion regarding voting procedures 
throughout Fiji in the September 1966 election. On July 8, 1966 the editor of the Fiji 
Times confirmed to the readers that the regulations stipulated that each voter was only 
permitted to return one vote in constituencies with multiple representatives. This 
would create a situation where the top three candidates receiving individual votes 
would be elected. The editor complained this was an unfair method of electing 
multiple representatives since the likely scenario to play out would be overwhelming 
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support to the most popular candidate and exceptionally underwhelming support to 
other candidates. High levels of support for the most popular candidate would create 
an illusion of non-support for qualified candidates who, being elected with very low 
tallies, were still likely to have significant support in their own rights. The most 
popular candidate would then have the appearance of more political capital than they 
actually obtain in the election.118 By July 30 the issue of single votes for multiple 
representatives had been resolved and voters were to be given the opportunity to vote 
for all of their representatives, but other issues continued to come to the forefront; 
specifically, on the boundaries of constituencies for communal and cross-voting 
purposes.119 Voters, having the opportunity to vote once for each eligible vacancy in 
their respective constituency, were more likely to vote outside of their own racial 
category. Candidates in the cross-voting districts had to appeal to all voters along 
political ideological lines instead of racial lines. Integrating voters was one of the 
goals of the new constitution and it seemed to be working.  
August 12 marked the final day for candidates to register for the Legislative 
Council election. In all, the Alliance and Federation parties nominated eighty-four 
candidates to fill thirty-four seats in the Legislative Council. The communal 
breakdown was twenty-eight Fijian candidates for twelve communal seats; thirty-five 
Indian candidates for twelve communal seats; and twenty-one candidates for ten 
General Elector seats.120 The Federation and Alliance put forward three female 
candidates: Irene Narayan (Suva, Indian), Margaret Bain (Suva, General) and Loloma 
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Livingston (Western Cross-Voting, General).121 Narayan ran as the Federation Party 
candidate facing off against Andrew Deoki, a veteran politician who was viewed by 
Federation Party leadership as a significant critic of Patel and the party. By putting up 
a relatively unknown female candidate against Deoki, Patel reasoned that Deoki 
might be more vulnerable to electoral defeat. That gamble paid off when Narayan 
trounced Deoki by a tally of 5,676 to 2,779, which allowed Patel to continue 
solidifying the Federation’s hold on Indian representation in the Legislative 
Council.122  
Leading up to the elections, the Fiji Times, the English language newspaper 
published in the capitol city of Suva, published a variety of articles and editorials 
intended to educate voters. As such, the newspaper was often accused of being pro-
Fijian and British. The Federation Party accused the Fiji Times of being anti-
Federation.123 Evidence of the pro-Alliance bias was plainly available to any reader of 
the paper on September 13, when the editors claimed that “the simple situation facing 
voters at this month’s elections is that only through electing the candidates selected 
by The Alliance, or those willing to work in close and loyal harmony with The 
Alliance for the benefit of the whole Colony, can Fiji be assured of such a 
government because, as Ratu Mara said, no others have offered or even prepared, ‘a 
programme of government’ for the Colony.”124 The claim made by Ratu Mara, 
leading the Alliance Party, that nobody else had offered alternate solutions was 
disingenuous since it completely ignored the campaigns of the Federation. A 
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newspaper endorsing the positions of certain candidates and parties is hardly 
surprising in an editorial section, but the strength of the statement created doubts 
among members of the Federation in the newspaper’s ability to report straight news 
related to the election. 
Despite the noticeable affirmations of pro-Fijian and British attitudes, the Fiji 
Times published candidate biographical sketches with accompanying photographs of 
each candidate throughout the months leading up to the elections in an ongoing 
section entitled “Election Who’s Who” beginning on August 24.125 Alternately, the 
newspaper published another regular section entitled, “What the Candidates Say” to 
provide candidates an opportunity to write out their positions and make their pitch 
directly to voters. Federation Party candidates generally did not put forth statements 
for inclusion in the Fiji Times.126 The Federation held a deep distrust in the Fiji Times 
going back to the pre-constitutional conference negotiations. This distrust reduced the 
available platforms to reach out to voters across the racial divide in the cross-voting 
constituencies. Even though the Federation did not take advantage of the opportunity 
afforded by the Fiji Times, there were Indian politicians outside of the party that took 
advantage. Jaswant Singh, and Indian member of the Alliance Party, ran for the West 
Viti Levu Indian communal seat. In his statement, Singh declared that as a member of 
the Alliance he would follow the policy statements put forth by the Alliance. He 
supported the concept of Fiji as a homeland for ethnic Indians, and as such supported 
more open talks “with the other races.” He also broke with Federation Party over the 
immediate application of common roll voting, supporting a slower approach to 
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bringing about that change.127 Singh’s position of slowly rolling out common roll 
voting was tied to the idea that if common roll voting were immediately applied it 
was likely that the Fijian population would not accept the results if the Legislative 
Council was dominated by Indians. This would pose more problems for Indians and 
Fijians than it could possibly solve. Thus, slowly applying the principles of common 
roll voting would slowly integrate the population rather than rush an integration that 
could create a backlash into worse racial relations.  
 Singh illustrated that the Indian community was not completely unified behind 
the Federation Party. The Alliance was not entirely composed of non-Indians, 
whereas the Federation was an Indian party. Koya, the Federation candidate, solidly 
defeated Singh by a tally of 6,318 to 2,221.128 Patel was then able to control Indian 
representation in the Legislative Council and was appointed as “Leader of the 
Opposition.”129 The elections of 1966 solidified the Federation as the Indian party. In 
two high profile constituencies, the Federation overcame challenges to their claim to 
represent Indian political interests. Ratu Mara became Fiji’s Chief Minister because 
the Alliance picked up a majority of seats in the Legislative Council and filled out the 
new Cabinet style of government. The two parties solidified their grip on the political 
identity of their respective communities by demonstrating their electoral appeal. 
However, while electoral politics strengthened the parties grip on communal politics, 
external events drove a wedge between the communities. 
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The United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (commonly 
referred to as the Committee of 24), established in 1962 to implement the Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, set its sights on 
colonial Fiji.130 The Fiji Times ran an editorial on August 16, 1966 responding to the 
Committee’s potential of a fact-finding mission. Ostensibly, the purpose of the visit 
was to gather information regarding the committee’s draft resolution calling for 
independence and common roll voting in Fiji. The editorial reported incredulously, 
“The implication seems to be that the poor, downtrodden, people of Fiji are so 
oppressed by Britain that they are unable to appeal to their saviours — from, of all 
places, Tanzania, Syria and Bulgaria. People living in Fiji will find it hard to believe 
that anyone could be so divorced from reality, but such is the fantasy in which this 
United Nations committee lives.”131 Fijian and European political leaders in Fiji 
viewed the committee as unfitting to condemn the government of Fiji because of the 
current and recent experiences of the countries that made up the committee.  
India, Tunisia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Madagascar, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and 
Ethiopia sponsored the resolution.132 The first country listed as sponsoring the 
resolution in the UN gave pause to Fijian and European politicians. India was calling 
for independence and a common roll vote in solidarity with the Indian political party 
of Fiji. The draft resolution echoed the Federation’s platform in many ways. While 
India had previously been involved in supporting Indians in other colonial contexts 
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before, in Fiji the Indian population was in the majority. The Fijian fear of an Indian 
dominated Fiji now had to contend with the potential for direct external support for 
Indians within Fiji.  
Despite full-throated support of the resolution from India’s delegates, it was 
John Male, the delegate from Tanzania who officially proposed the resolution.133 
Once again, the Fiji Times called into question where the UN delegates from India 
were getting their information related to Fiji, especially since the Alliance leadership 
suspected that it was India’s delegates pushing the draft resolution. “It would be 
useful to be told where the New Delhi spokesman gets his inspiration, though much 
of the twaddle presented to the committee has an extraordinarily familiar ring to 
people who have been subjected to the harangues of various local demagogues in 
Fiji.”134 The newspaper expressed what Fijian and European leaders suspected. 
Without an explicit accusation, the author of the editorial accused Indian political 
leaders of attempting to use the United Nations to achieve what they were unable to 
accomplish through negotiations at the constitutional conference the year prior.  
Ratu Mara, on behalf of the Alliance, accused the Federation of inviting 
outside interference in Fijian political matters, sowing the seeds of discord and 
encouraging hatred. In a broadcast speech in Fiji on September 23, 1966, He stated, 
“But, let me say this clearly, there will be no welcome in Fiji for ignorant and ill-
disposed interference in our affairs from outside.”135 Ratu Mara addressed what he 
viewed as the potential for UN meddling, but Patel was the intended target. Later in 
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the same speech, Mara said, “We know, for instance, that British Guiana was a 
peaceful country till one politician and his followers at a general election told his 
supporters to vote only for candidates of their own race. The evil seeds of racism 
were then sown in the policies of that country, bringing misery, fear and death to 
hundreds of its people and near ruin to its economy.”136 Mara’s words, clearly 
associated with Patel, betrayed the policies that Mara himself had advocated. Just 
one-year prior, it was Mara and the other Fijian delegates that advocated for retaining 
communal voting. It was not the Federation that advocated voting based strictly on 
communal category; it was the Alliance.  
The Committee of 24 passed the resolution calling for common roll voting and 
the establishment of a date for independence, with a final tally of twenty in favor 
against three opposed. Great Britain, the United States, and Australia opposed the 
resolution claiming to represent the majority consensus of Fijians.137 Frederick Lee, 
the last Secretary of State for the Colonies, simply said, “We are not in any way 
bound to honour the committee’s resolutions. We think they lack experience and 
knowledge, and therefore, because we think they are not doing any particularly good 
service, we rather believe the thing to do is to go on in the way we are going…”138 
Despite the vote of the committee, it was manifestly apparent that the British had no 
intention of complying. The result of the resolution was the retention of the status quo 
                                                
136 Ibid. 
137 "Rebuff to Meddlers." Fiji Times, September 9, 1966, 1. 
138 “Lee, Frederick, Baron Lee of Newton (1906–1984),” David Howell in Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, eee ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison 
(Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2011, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/65951 (accessed August 12, 2015). Also, 





constitutionally, but debates in the UN and in Fiji regarding the resolution called into 
sharp contrast communal politics in Suva. The Federation, representing the Indian 
community, continued its calls for common roll voting and independence, a set of 
policies that aligned with the Committee of 24. The Alliance, representing Fijian 
interests, considered the resolution to be a challenge to Fijian control of Fiji. An 
immediate move to common roll voting and independence would have meant 
forgoing all of the advantages the Fijian community secured in the constitutional 
conference.  
Following the elections of 1963 political leaders in Fiji’s Legislative Council 
began negotiations for a constitutional conference to be held in London. The 
contentious negotiations clarified the communal divide in Fiji. After negotiations 
were concluded in Fiji, the constitutional conference began in London. The 
agreement forged in the constitutional conference further codified communal division. 
When voters went to the polls in late 1966 the result was solidified political identities 
as the communal vote results went straight down party lines. Federation candidates 
won all of the available communal Indian seats while the Alliance did the same for 
Fijian seats. While the elections firmed up communal support along party lines in Fiji, 
activities outside of Fiji also affected political division. The UN Committee of 24 
voted for a resolution that supported the Federation’s call for common roll voting and 
a set date for independence. Ratu Mara viewed A.D. Patel with suspicion, accusing 
him of exciting trouble in Fiji on behalf of the Indian population. Regardless of the 
suspicions that existed between the two men, the constitution was designed to ensure 






CHAPTER 3. CONCEALING COMMUNAL DIVISION TO OBTAIN 
INDEPENDENCE 
The 1966 elections were followed by a period of political calm in Fiji as the 
leaders of the Alliance and Federation adjusted to their new roles in the newly formed 
government. The Alliance formed the majority government while the Federation took 
its place as the Opposition party. By January of 1970 Fiji, both parties focused on the 
next leap in constitutional change, independence. Both the Alliance and Federation 
concluded that it was preferable to proceed towards “Dominion Status” rather than to 
remain in the colonial status that the Fijian political leadership had advocated for just 
a few years prior.139 Despite agreeing to proceed toward Dominion Status with 
membership in the Commonwealth, the old conflicts of electoral methodology 
remained along with the paramountcy claims of the Fijian people.140  
 Siddiq Koya, the Federation vice-president took over as the leader of the 
Federation Party in October 1969. Under Koya’s leadership, the Federation renewed 
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talks with the Alliance to advance Fijian independence.141 These discussions 
culminated in a joint statement by Koya and Ratu Mara on January 17, 1970: 
“Inter-party discussions have led to the point where it is agreed that 
Fiji should proceed to Dominion Status. Following on this agreement 
we have invited Lord Shepherd to visit Fiji as soon as convenient to 
acquaint himself at first hand with the position. It is our intention that 
we reach Dominion Status as soon as possible without fresh elections 
being held beforehand and we will in due course introduce a motion in 
the Legislative Council to formalise this request.”142  
 
The joint statement indicated a desire for a speedy conclusion to British governance 
over Fiji. To accomplish that, both parties were willing to forgo elections. In effect 
Koya and Mara announced that they were now prepared to negotiate the future of Fiji 
without direct influence from London. Lord Shepherd, Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, accepted the invitation and arrived in Fiji January 26, 
departing ten days later on February 3.143 
The Federation continued advocating for a fully independent Fiji, including an 
elected President as head of state, but accepted the compromise of remaining within 
the Commonwealth. Accepting Dominion Status was a compromise though not a 
significant loss to Indian goals of independence. While the Federation’s position 
remained relatively unchanged, the Alliance had shifted its platform. Instead of 
remaining as a colony, the Alliance proposed Dominion Status with the Queen as the 
head of state.144 The change in party platform came on the heels of Alliance control of 
the government for three years, and the party perceived that the time was right to 
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move towards self-government while retaining control. Under the current political 
situation, Fijians would control Fiji for the foreseeable future.  
 The speed of progress towards independence surprised many observers.145 
Shepherd briefly commented on the issue of paramountcy, a specific concern that had 
previously caused consternation. Negotiators representing the Federation and 
Alliance agreed that a reference would be made to the Deed of Cession in the 
preamble to the constitution.146 The Fijian claim to paramountcy was largely based on 
the Deed of Cession. British policy throughout the history of the colony had placed 
the Fijian community at the forefront, but in referencing the Deed of Cession in the 
preamble, there was a significant risk of alienating the Indian community. This 
decision, agreed to by Indian negotiators, effectively entrenched the position of the 
Indian community as secondary to the Fijian community. Political expediency on 
behalf of the Indian negotiators might explain why they were willing to accept the 
situation. Indians remained in the majority and following eventual independence the 
constitution could be altered to rectify any agreements that were made in advance.    
 The constitutional conference to set the conditions for independence opened 
April 20, 1970 and ran through May 5, 1970.147 The opening speeches of the 
conference in London illustrated an impressive level of verbal acrobatics from all 
three of the major leaders. Shepherd extolled the advancement of tolerance in Fiji 
stating, “The peoples of Fiji have surmounted those problems in remarkable degree. 
Their racial tolerance and mutual understanding, their ability to live together in 
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goodwill, have placed them in high regard among their friends and neighbours in the 
world.”148 The idea that tolerance was a reality in Fiji ignored the continued political 
isolation enshrined by communal roll voting and the continued economic isolation 
whereby Fijians communally owned the overwhelming majority of land while Indians, 
unable to own land, possessed the majority of leases.  His opening speech was much 
rosier than the speeches that followed. 
Ratu Mara followed Shepherd saying, “It will be a measure of the success of 
this Conference if the Constitution we finally approve will enable us to create a Fiji 
where people of different races, opinions and cultures can live and work together for 
the good of all; can differ without rancour, govern without violence, and accept 
responsibility as reasonable people intent on serving the best interests of all.”149 
Mara’s comments, aimed at Koya and the opposition party, were at best disingenuous. 
Mara, just four years prior, accused Patel and the Federation of stirring up trouble that 
would lead to violence. His comments regard working together for the benefit of all 
residents of Fiji while steering clear of the topic of unity. Mara’s goals were couched 
in negative terms. Communal differentiation remained an accepted part of his plans 
for governance in Fiji, communal groups working together without becoming a 
unified nationality.  
Koya also addressed the issue of race during his opening speech saying that 
“it behooves therefore all of us to see that the new Constitution is one which will 
expressly and/or by clear implication guide the people of Fiji to unite rather than 
divide. It should produce conditions which would be conducive to and consistent with 
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the making of the country into one nation and one people.”150 Koya’s speech 
indicated a desire to create a single nationality in Fiji. Throughout the previous 
constitutional negotiations, the Federation had argued that the best way to achieve 
unity in Fiji was through common roll. Of course, the unity that Koya called for 
would likely have led to a Federation, and therefore by default an Indian, led 
government in Fiji.  
 In an address to the House of Lords following the Conference, Shepherd 
commented on the speed at which Fiji’s communal divisions had been ameliorated. 
He said that after the contentious nature of the previous constitutional conference in 
1965 “it is hard to believe that some five years later we should be considering an 
Independence 882 Bill for Fiji.”151 According to Shepherd, he was warned that 
moving Fiji to independence was “premature.” Despite those cautions, he undertook 
the trip to Fiji to begin negotiating with the Federation and Alliance. He claimed that 
during his visit he “did not feel any sense of racial tension. I found an Indian 
Commissioner, or a Commissioner of Indian origin, acting in a totally Fijian district, 
with no problems at all. It was perhaps as a consequence of that, more than as a 
consequence of the assurances that I received from the political leaders, that I felt that 
it was right that Fiji should proceed to independence.”152 It is not surprising then to 
see that Shepherd’s visit did not illuminate racial divisions. He was invited to Fiji in a 
joint effort by the Federation and Alliance to be shown that Fiji was ready for 
independence. Both parties had reasons for desiring independence and both 
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understood that to move in the direction of independence Shepherd had to be 
convinced of communal harmony. The Federation viewed this trip as an opportunity 
to move forward with their desire for an independent Fiji, while the Alliance saw 
independence as a chance to consolidate political power through a Fijian controlled 
Fijian government without direct British oversight.  
As Fiji raced towards Independence on October 10, 1970, the world either 
appeared to believe racial harmony had been broken out in Fiji, or was willing to 
suspend disbelief based on the previous decade of political clashes to get to the 
desired end, regardless of what would come post independence. The New York Times 
commented on the apparent breakout of cordiality in Fiji. An article appeared on 
March 23, 1970 entitled, “Sudden Racial Harmony on Fiji Speeds Plan for 
Independence.”153 The Fiji Times noted in an editorial on April 18, 1970, that a 
“climate of goodwill now prevails throughout Fiji and there are no signs that it will 
not continue.”154 Fijian and Indian leaders saw communal division as an obstacle to 
their goals of consolidating power through independence.   
Regardless of what was happening with communal divisions below the 
surface, if Fijians wanted independence they had only to ask for it. A Fiji Times 
editor sought to counter the suggestion by the Soviet delegate to the UN that Fiji’s 
independence had been “clear evidence of the ‘incomparable struggle’ against 
colonialism.” Rather, according to the editor, Fiji was a unique case in the recent 
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history of the British Empire in which there was no struggle, only a simple request 
from Fijians to which Britain acquiesced to without much difficulty.155  
Not everyone was convinced by the show of harmony in Fiji. Australia 
controlled seventy percent of Fiji’s economic interests. As seen in a classified 
evaluation of Fiji, the government in Canberra remained concerned over racial and 
ethnic tensions in Fiji.156 So long as Koya and Mara could maintain their close 
relationship, racial harmony was expected to continue, though the prospects were not 
very great. Mara was described as being “moody, proud, and sensitive to criticism.” 
He was also “liable to over-react to anything he could perceive as a personal 
slight.”157 One key to watch, according to the National Intelligence Committee (NIC), 
which produced the report, was the willingness of Mara to use violence against 
Indians.158 Koya, on the other hand was evaluated as having “strong personality and a 
political history of excitability and outspokenness.”159 Communal harmony depended 
on these two men and their ability to continue their commitment to harmony.  
The appearance of harmony covered tensions just long enough to rush into 
independence on the 96th anniversary of the signing of the Deed of Cession. Indeed, 
the rapidity of the process excluded the potential for fresh elections, or even 
consideration for how representation in the legislature would be determined. It was in 
the interest of both major political parties to gain independence, but for different 
reasons. The Alliance, controlling the government, saw an opportunity to retake Fiji 
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for Fijians. Independence therefore was an opportunity to solidify their position going 
into the future. The Federation had supported independence from the beginning of the 
party. For it, independence was an opportunity to exploit demographic dominance 
and reverse the political control of Fijians. Thus, even the constitutional changes 
leading to independence were driven in large part by communal division despite the 










 The Burns and Spate reports created the foundation for a decade of change in 
Fiji. Critically, their reports recommended the eventual absolution of the Fijian 
Adminsitration. The practical result of that would have been to reduce communal 
isolation in Fiji. This threatened the Fijian Council of Chiefs who advocated for 
strengthened control of Fijians through continued cultural isolation. In 1963, the 
Great Council of Chiefs suffered a blow to their authority when Fijians obtained the 
right to vote for three of their representatives on the Legislative Council. Despite 
losing some control over the Legislative Council representatives, the communal roll 
aspect of voting in Fiji ensured that Fijians would continue to politically support only 
Fijians. Similarly, Indians could only vote for Indians and Europeans for Europeans. 
After the elections, the Indian representatives in the Legislative Council combined 
disparate, local, Indian political parties to create the first colony-wide political party 
as a communally based party. The Fijians followed suit a few years later. Isolation 
between the communal groups began to fade, but political isolation remained the 
norm as their communal groups identified residents of Fiji politically. 
 In 1965 London held a constitutional conference to move Fiji towards self-
governance. Contentious negotiations marred the lead up to the conference. While, 
communal roll voting continued, one major change permitted cross voting in some 





Both Indian and Fijian negotiators argued for policies that would strengthen their 
position within the Fijian government. The resulting constitution ensured that Fijians 
would obtain a majority in the 1966 election cycle. Indeed, when the votes were 
tallied in 1966, the Alliance created the new government with the Federation as the 
Opposition. Notably, the Federation retained the position of the political party that 
represented Indians, defeating all communal challengers. While Indian negotiators 
failed to obtain their goals of common roll voting and independence, the Committee 
of 24 echoed their calls through a UN resolution. That the resolution aligned so 
closely with the Federation’s platform only reinforced divisions between the political 
leaders of Fiji. The constitutional conference codified communal division in the 
Legislative Council, and the elections solidified communal support for the developing 
political parties in Fiji.  
  Communal division was an obstacle in the way of Fijian independence. By 
the beginning of 1970, the Alliance had been in power for three years. The 
constitution seemingly ensured continued Fijian dominance of the Legislative 
Council and so independence with Fijian control of Fiji was a realistic proposal. The 
Federation’s platform still called for immediate independence along with common 
roll voting. Common roll voting was still farther than the Alliance would accept, but 
both communal parties now accepted independence as the next step. The only 
obstacle in the way was British concerns over communal division and strife. To 
overcome this difficulty, the leaders of the Alliance and Federation joined together in 
a joint statement and orchestrated a visit for Shepard to demonstrate a harmonious 





divisions were concealed to obtain a common goal, but the reality was that communal 
division and distrust was still active.   
On October 10, 1970 Fiji took its independence with a Fijian controlled 
legislature. The constitution of 1966 had all but guaranteed that result, and the goal of 
the Alliance to maintain a Fiji controlled by Fijians appeared to be secure. However, 
just seven years later during the 1977 elections, the National Federation Party won 
half of the seats in the House of Representatives. The Indian party did not act quickly 
enough to set up a government, and so the governor then asked the Alliance to set up 
a temporary government until new elections could be held. The result of the second 
election put the Alliance back in control by a firm majority once more returning the 
government to indigenous Fijian control. By 1987 the political situation had improved 
for the National Federation Party when it formed a coalition government with the Fiji 
Labour Party, a class based party.160 This time Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka 
initiated a military coup at 10:00 AM, May 14, 1987.161 Three more coups occurred 
over the next twenty years.162 The impacts of communal division in Fijian elections 
lasted into the twenty-first century. 
Isolation dominated communal relations in Fiji from the beginning of the 
colony, but as the 1960’s proceeded, isolation gave way to more regular interactions. 
One place these interactions took place was in the Legislative Council where Fijians, 
Indians, and Europeans were represented. Communal voting ensured that residents of 
Fiji were represented, but it also ensured that issues dealt with in the Council were 
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considered based on communal advantage. The constitution assured communal 
isolation by defining the community in which a voter belonged, but it was the 
elections that defined communal, political identity. The success of the burgeoning 
political parties made certain that communal identity was more important than 
political ideology or economic class in determining representation in the Legislative 
Council. Ultimately, in the political sphere, communal isolation gave way to political 
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